Owner, Challenger, Decider

Making Independent Challenge Count


When the CRO and the CIO disagree about a risk, what happens next?

It is a useful question to put to any investment governance structure. The answer reveals whether decision authority, risk ownership and independent oversight have been deliberately established or simply assumed.

Some institutions point to an escalation procedure. Others describe a culture of open debate. Some maintain that the CRO has the authority to say no.

But those answers leave a more fundamental question unresolved. Who owns the risk, who challenges it, and who has the authority to decide?

In Risk Ownership Is Not Risk Minimisation, I argued that the risk owner is not necessarily the risk management function. The owner is the individual or body accountable for an exposure, with a defined ability to influence or change it.

That distinction raises a further question. If the risk function does not own the exposure, what authority should it have? And how can it provide meaningful independent oversight without assuming responsibility for investment decisions?

The answer begins with three distinct governance responsibilities: Owner, Challenger and Decider.

Three Roles, Three Questions

The framework is straightforward, but the distinctions matter.

The Owner: What risk are we taking, and why is it worth taking?

The owner is accountable for an exposure and has the authority to influence or change it.

Depending on the institution and the decision involved, this may be the CIO, an investment committee, a total-portfolio function or an investment team operating within delegated authority.

Ownership involves more than accepting a risk limit. It requires understanding the exposure, explaining why the expected compensation justifies it and managing the position as conditions change.

The Challenger: Is the case for this risk as strong as the owner believes?

The challenger provides an independent assessment of the owner's judgement. This responsibility typically belongs to the CRO and the independent investment risk function.

The challenger examines assumptions, identifies unintended exposures, tests alternative outcomes and questions whether the resulting portfolio remains consistent with the institution's intended risk profile.

The role includes proposing alternatives, documenting material concerns and escalating unresolved issues when necessary.

The Decider: Having considered the case and the challenge, what risk are we prepared to accept?

The decider has the authority to approve or reject a proposal within the institution's governance framework.

At the strategic level, the board or its designated committee typically approves risk appetite, strategic risk budgets and investment policies. Within those boundaries, investment decisions may be delegated to the CIO or other authorised bodies.

The relevant decider therefore depends on the nature of the decision. A routine portfolio adjustment and a proposed change in institutional risk appetite should not require the same level of approval.

These responsibilities must be clearly distinguished, even where an individual performs more than one role under delegated authority. In particular, independent challenge must remain separate from the investment judgement being challenged.

Each role contributes something the others cannot fully provide for themselves.

What Happens When the Roles Are Blurred?

One way to assess a governance structure is to examine what happens when these responsibilities become confused.

Owner without Challenger is self-review.

An investment team that proposes an exposure, determines its size, assesses its appropriateness and evaluates its own decisions may exercise considerable discipline. But the process still depends on the same people examining their own investment thesis.

A capable investment owner should question assumptions and reassess convictions. Independent challenge adds a perspective that does not depend on defending the original investment decision.

Challenger without Decider is commentary.

A risk function may produce sophisticated analysis, identify emerging concentrations and document material vulnerabilities. Yet without a credible route to someone authorised to address those concerns, its influence may end with the report.

The analysis can be accurate and timely while having little effect on the portfolio.

Decider without Owner is abstraction.

A board may establish risk budgets and approve limits without clearly assigning responsibility for managing the resulting exposures.

The decision has formal authority, but implementation and subsequent accountability remain uncertain.

Challenger as Decider can transfer ownership into the control function.

If the CRO routinely makes investment decisions rather than independently assessing them, accountability becomes confused. Investment teams may begin treating the risk function as responsible for risks they themselves proposed.

A CRO may appropriately hold specifically defined stop or veto powers in some governance arrangements. Those powers should be explicit, limited to their intended purpose and accompanied by clear accountability.

The general distinction remains: investment ownership belongs with those authorised to manage the portfolio, while independent oversight provides challenge.

The objective is to ensure that ownership, challenge and decision authority reinforce one another without allowing accountability to become unclear.

Challenge Is the Link That Gets Assumed

In Governance Is an Investment Advantage, I discussed the importance of knowing "who recommends, who challenges, who decides, who implements and who monitors."

That decision chain provides a useful starting point.

In many investment organisations, the responsibilities for recommending, implementing and monitoring investments are relatively well established. Formal approval authorities are also commonly documented.

Independent challenge is less straightforward.

Most institutions recognise its importance. The more difficult questions concern who is responsible for providing it, whether that person can challenge senior investment leadership and what happens when the challenge is unwelcome.

The existence of a risk management department does not resolve those questions.

Effective challenge depends on both the authority of the function and the independence of the people exercising that authority.

Where Independence Actually Comes From

Independence is frequently described as a feature of the CRO position. In practice, it depends on how the institution is governed.

Four structural arrangements are particularly important.

Reporting relationships. The CRO should have direct and unrestricted access to the board or its designated risk committee. A dual reporting arrangement can provide functional accountability to the board while maintaining administrative reporting to the CEO.

In some institutions, administrative reporting may sit with the CIO. That arrangement creates a more direct potential conflict because the CRO is expected to challenge the investment decisions of the same executive responsible for aspects of the function's administration. It therefore requires particularly clear safeguards protecting independent judgement, resources and escalation rights.

The distinction between functional and administrative reporting matters. If material risk concerns must pass through the executive whose decisions are being challenged, the CRO's ability to exercise independent judgement may be constrained.

Appointment and removal. Board involvement in the appointment, assessment and dismissal of the CRO provides an important safeguard. A formal reporting line offers limited protection if the person being challenged can unilaterally remove the challenger.

Access and escalation. The CRO should be able to meet privately with the board or relevant committee when necessary. Material disagreements should have a defined route for escalation, including the ability to record an independent assessment in the formal decision process.

Compensation and evaluation. The CRO's remuneration and performance assessment should reflect the quality of risk oversight, independent judgement and the effectiveness of the function. They should not depend primarily on the investment returns generated by the decisions being reviewed.

These safeguards are consistent with established financial-sector governance principles. The Basel Committee's Corporate Governance Principles for Banks, particularly paragraphs 110 and 111, address the CRO's independence, board access, appointment and dismissal arrangements. Paragraph 147 reinforces the importance of determining remuneration for control functions independently of the business activities they oversee.

Although developed for banks, these principles provide useful considerations for institutional investors, subject to their own mandates and governance arrangements.

Formal independence also requires sufficient resources, expertise and access to information. A CRO cannot provide credible challenge without the ability to understand the portfolio and evaluate the consequences of material investment decisions.

These structural protections become most important when the CRO's assessment differs from the investment leadership's preferred course of action.

Independence Without Isolation

Greater organisational independence does not automatically produce more effective oversight.

Consider a CRO who operates at a considerable distance from the investment process. The function reports independently to the board, produces detailed assessments and reviews portfolio decisions after implementation.

Its independence may be clear, yet its opportunity to influence those decisions is limited.

By the time a material concern reaches the investment committee, the portfolio may already have changed. In private markets, contractual commitments may make adjustments particularly difficult or costly.

At the other extreme, a risk function may be closely integrated into every investment discussion while depending entirely on the CIO for its authority, resources and career prospects.

The function understands the portfolio, but its willingness to challenge a high-conviction investment may be weakened.

Neither arrangement provides an adequate balance.

What the institution needs is a CRO who is independent in judgement and structure, but involved in the investment decision process.

This means access to relevant information while proposals are being developed, participation in material portfolio discussions and the ability to present an independent assessment before commitments are made.

The distinction between independence and participation is also recognised in established governance guidance.

Paragraph 105 of the Basel Committee's Corporate Governance Principles for Banks identifies influencing and, when necessary, challenging decisions that create material risk as a responsibility of the independent risk management function. Paragraph 109 expects the CRO to participate in key decision-making processes, including strategic planning and capital and liquidity planning.

These provisions address banking institutions, but the underlying governance principle is relevant to long-term institutional investors. Independent oversight is most useful when it can contribute to decisions while they are being developed, rather than merely evaluating the consequences afterwards.

Participation, however, should not be confused with investment accountability.

The CRO can question assumptions, recommend changes and identify circumstances requiring escalation without becoming jointly responsible for selecting investments or delivering their returns.

Independent risk oversight should also be distinguished from internal audit. The risk function provides continuing assessment and challenge as part of management's governance arrangements. Internal audit provides independent assurance over the effectiveness of governance, risk management and controls.

Both functions contribute to accountability, but they have different responsibilities.

The central issue is therefore the effectiveness of independent challenge within the decision process, rather than organisational separation alone.

Where Does the Investment Risk Team Fit?

In some institutions, investment risk sits inside the investment organisation. A total-fund or "asset mix and risk" team reports to the CIO, supporting risk budgeting, exposure analysis and portfolio-level advice, while a separate function provides independent oversight.The label matters less than the role.

A risk team within the CIO's organisation typically supports risk ownership. It measures total-fund exposures, informs asset-mix decisions and provides a common view of risk across asset classes. That is a strength. A total-portfolio owner cannot manage risks it cannot see, and proximity to investment decisions means the team's analysis can influence proposals before capital is committed.

Such a team can also provide valuable internal challenge to individual investment teams. It may question assumptions, identify overlapping exposures and recommend changes to portfolio construction.

But internal challenge should not be confused with independent oversight of the CIO's decisions.

The same structural questions apply. Who appoints and removes the team's head? Who evaluates its performance? Can material concerns be escalated beyond the CIO, and can an independent view be recorded without the CIO's agreement?

Where those authorities ultimately rest with the CIO, the team strengthens the owner's risk management capability. It does not replace independent challenge.

This points to a layered model. Internal challenge improves investment decisions within the owner's organisation. Independent challenge provides a separate assessment of whether those decisions remain consistent with the institution's intended risk profile. The two functions complement each other.

The distinction becomes particularly important when the embedded team helps develop the risk budget and subsequently monitors portfolio exposures against it. Monitoring adherence to an approved risk budget is a legitimate management responsibility. But the institution still needs an independent assessment of whether that budget remains appropriate and whether the resulting portfolio reflects the risks it intended to own.

The practical risk is one of governance clarity. A board that sees "Risk" on an organisation chart may assume independent oversight exists when the investment organisation has simply strengthened its own analytical capability.

The question is not simply who analyses the risk or where the team sits. It is whether someone can challenge the owner without needing the owner's permission.

Challenge Must See the Total Portfolio

The need for independent challenge becomes particularly important when investment decisions are assessed at the total-portfolio level.

Within traditional asset-class structures, investment teams are generally accountable for the portfolios they manage. Each team may have a defensible investment thesis and remain within its assigned limits.

Yet individual investment decisions can produce unintended exposures when viewed collectively.

An increase in private equity commitments, for example, may appear attractive based on expected returns, manager selection and the proposed allocation.

The independent risk function may identify concerns that extend beyond the private equity portfolio.

The new commitments could increase exposure to economic growth risks already present in listed equities and credit. They may add sensitivity to financing conditions or create future liquidity demands that overlap with commitments elsewhere in the fund.

These concerns do not necessarily invalidate the investment proposal. They change how its contribution to the total portfolio should be assessed.

The challenge should be able to distinguish between the institution's intended macroeconomic risk exposures, the market and style factors introduced through implementation, and the manager-specific risks associated with generating alpha.

Each level has different implications.

If the proposal materially changes the institution's strategic economic risk profile, the issue may require reconsideration at the total-fund level. If it introduces overlapping implementation exposures, the owner may be able to adjust allocations or reduce other positions. If the concern is primarily manager-specific, the appropriate response may involve position sizing, manager selection or investment terms.

This is where a common portfolio reference point becomes valuable.

A reference portfolio, where appropriately designed, can help the institution assess whether a proposed allocation moves the total fund toward or away from its deliberately chosen risk profile.

It also allows the challenger to examine opportunities across organisational boundaries rather than relying only on the limits established for individual asset classes.

The independent risk function may support the proposed investment while recommending a smaller commitment, a different funding source or an offsetting adjustment elsewhere.

The result can be a better portfolio decision without requiring the CRO to assume investment ownership.

Challenge Works in Both Directions

There is an important implication of the distinction between risk ownership and risk minimisation.

Risk frameworks often focus on excess exposures: too much leverage, insufficient liquidity, excessive concentration or breaches of established limits.

These are essential considerations. But risk minimisation is not the institution's investment objective.

An independent challenger should also be prepared to question whether the portfolio is taking too little risk.

Consider an institution that has experienced a significant market drawdown. Investment teams may become reluctant to rebalance into declining assets. The board may prefer to wait for greater certainty, even when the portfolio has moved materially below its intended exposure.

The decision to remain cautious may feel prudent from the perspective of individual careers or short-term outcomes. Yet it may also increase the risk of failing to achieve the institution's long-term investment objectives.

In that situation, effective challenge could mean questioning the decision to avoid risk.

The distinction between two questions is important:

Are we still within the risk budget?

Is this still the right risk budget?

The first concerns the portfolio's position relative to approved boundaries. The second requires judgement about whether those boundaries remain appropriate given the institution's objectives and circumstances.

The CRO should be able to raise both questions. Any decision to revise the approved risk appetite remains with the appropriate governing authority.

Independent challenge therefore needs to evaluate risks being accepted and risks being avoided.

Challenge is not an instruction to take less risk. It is a test of whether the institution is taking the risks it intends to own.

When the CRO and CIO Disagree

Return to the opening question.

Suppose the CIO supports an investment that the CRO believes will create an undesirable concentration of economic risk or materially weaken portfolio liquidity.

The CRO presents the assessment, including its assumptions, supporting evidence and potential consequences under adverse scenarios.

The CIO may respond by modifying the proposal. The two functions may also reach different conclusions because they place different weights on expected returns, portfolio resilience or the probability of adverse outcomes.

Disagreement is not necessarily evidence that the governance framework has failed.

What matters is how the disagreement is handled.

If the decision remains within the institution's approved mandate, risk limits and delegated authority, the CIO or relevant investment committee may have the authority to proceed. Where the disagreement is material, the independent assessment and the rationale for the final decision should be documented, with escalation available under the established governance framework.

If the proposal requires an exception to a binding risk limit, a change in strategic risk appetite or another decision reserved for the board, it must be referred to the appropriate authority.

The CRO must have a credible route to escalate material unresolved concerns, including direct access to the governing body when warranted.

That route should not depend on the agreement of the executive being challenged.

At the same time, escalation should not turn every difference of investment judgement into a board decision. Clear materiality thresholds, delegated authorities and escalation procedures are necessary to preserve effective management.

Nor should the CRO acquire an informal veto simply because the independent risk function disagrees. Any formal approval, stop or veto authority must be explicitly established.

Once an authorised decision is reached, the investment owner remains accountable for implementing and managing the exposure. The independent risk function continues to assess the resulting risk and can escalate subsequent developments.

As I argued in Risk Ownership Is Not Risk Minimisation, accountability without a path to influence the portfolio is little more than reporting responsibility.

The same principle applies to the challenger.

A risk function that identifies material concerns but cannot bring them to an appropriate decision authority may provide valuable analysis without effective oversight.

Independent challenge must have a credible path to influence the decision, even when the final authority rests elsewhere.

Independence Also Depends on Culture

Formal structures are necessary, but they cannot fully determine how people behave.

A CRO may have direct board access and clearly documented escalation rights while remaining reluctant to challenge the CIO's highest-conviction investment.

Professional relationships, career prospects and organisational expectations influence how readily people express disagreement.

A culture that formally welcomes challenge but informally penalises it will eventually weaken the effectiveness of independent oversight.

The board and senior leadership have an important role in establishing expectations.

An independent risk assessment should be evaluated on the quality of its reasoning and evidence, even when the conclusion proves inconvenient. A well-supported challenge should not become a career liability simply because the authorised decision-maker reaches a different conclusion.

The risk function also has responsibilities.

Independence is not a reason to oppose investment proposals automatically. Effective challenge requires technical competence, sound investment judgement and a willingness to recognise when taking additional risk is appropriate.

A CRO who consistently recommends less risk without considering the institution's objectives may be independent of investment performance incentives, but that alone does not make the advice effective.

The value of challenge lies in improving the quality of the decision.

A Test for Your Own Organisation

Three questions can reveal a great deal about how these responsibilities operate in practice.

First, can you identify the owner, challenger and decider for the institution's most material risks?

Consider the largest economic factor exposures, liquidity requirements and concentrations across the total portfolio. Is someone clearly accountable for managing each exposure? Is there a genuinely independent function capable of challenging the assessment? Is it clear who can authorise changes or approve exceptions?

The relevant responsibilities should be identifiable without relying on an informal understanding of who usually makes the decision.

Second, what happened the last time the investment and risk functions materially disagreed?

Was the concern raised early enough to influence the proposal? Did the owner provide a reasoned response? Was the matter resolved within delegated authority or escalated when appropriate? Was the rationale documented?

An effective process does not require every disagreement to reach the board. It requires a clear record of how material concerns were addressed and why the final decision was authorised.

Third, what protects the CRO when the challenge is inconvenient?

Who determines the CRO's performance assessment, compensation and continued appointment? Can the CRO meet the board without the CIO present? Can an independent opinion be formally recorded and considered even when investment leadership disagrees?

The answers reveal whether independence is supported by governance arrangements or depends mainly on personal relationships.

The Test of Effective Governance

Investment governance ultimately needs to connect the institution's long-term mandate with the risks actually held in the portfolio.

The board establishes the institution's intended risk appetite and approves the framework within which investment decisions are made. Investment leadership is accountable for constructing and managing the portfolio. Independent risk oversight evaluates whether the resulting exposures remain consistent with that intent.

These responsibilities must continue to operate as markets, liabilities, liquidity needs and portfolio opportunities evolve.

The effectiveness of the CRO should therefore not be judged primarily by how many investment proposals are challenged, how many limits are enforced or how frequently concerns are escalated.

A more meaningful test is whether independent challenge improves investment decisions and helps the institution maintain accountability for the risks it accepts.

The owner must be able to manage the risk. The challenger must be able to question it independently. The decider must have the authority and information required to resolve material choices.

Each responsibility matters, and their connection matters just as much.

The test of a governance structure is not whether challenge is permitted. It is whether challenge can survive being inconvenient and still influence the decision.


References and Further Reading

Financial Stability Board (2013). Principles for an Effective Risk Appetite Framework. Establishes principles concerning risk appetite, risk limits and the responsibilities of governing bodies and senior management.

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015). Corporate Governance Principles for Banks. Principle 6, particularly paragraphs 105 and 109–111, addresses the authority, participation and independence of the risk management function and CRO. Principle 11 (paragraph 147) addresses the independence of compensation arrangements for control functions.

The Institute of Internal Auditors (2026). Three Lines Model: Assurance and Advice in Support of Effective Governance. Statement of Position, published July 8, 2026. Sets out the roles of the governing body, management and internal audit, emphasising accountability, coordination and the distinct contributions of these roles to effective governance.

These frameworks provide relevant governance principles rather than universally applicable requirements for pension funds and other institutional asset owners. Their implementation depends on each institution's mandate, legal structure and governing authorities.

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